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This paper encompasses multiple sources of inefficiency introduced
by the U.S. tax system into a single general equilibrium model.
Using disaggregate calculations of user cost, we measure interasset
distortions from the differential taxation of many types of assets.
Simultaneously, we model the intersectoral distortions from the
differential treatment of the corporate sector, noncorporate
sector, and owner—occupied housing. Industries in the model have
different uses of assets and degrees of incorporation. Results
indicate that distortions between sectors are much smaller than
those of the Harberger model. Distortions among industries are
also much smaller than those in models using average effective tax
rates. Distortions among assets are larger, but the total of all
these welfare costs is still below one percent of income.
Don Fullerton
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617/973—3809Practical constraints preclude the elimination of all sources
of economic inefficiency introduced by our tax system, and
analysts differ as to the relative importance of each. As a
consequence, any particular tax reform initiative is likely to
address only a few types of inefficiencies while ignoring or
exacerbating others. In fact, different models have been used to
measure different tax distortions, and consistent comparison is
difficult. Policymakers are left without comparable estimates of
the relative size of different tax distortions, and therefore
without clear guidance on the choice among alternative reforms.
The purpose of this paper is to encompass multiple sources of
inefficiency into a single general equilibrium model of the U.S.
tax system. Starting from disaggregate calculations of user
cost, we incorporate interasset distortions arising from the
differential tax treatment of many types of equipment, struc-
tures, inventories, and land. Simultaneously, we model the
intersectoral distortions arising from the differential treatment
of the corporate sector, noncorporate sector, and owner—occupied
housing. Because industries differ in their relative use of
assets and degree of incorporation, our model also captures
interindustry distortions arising from the differential treatment
of industries. The model contains only a rudimentary treatment
of intertemporal consumption decisions, so this paper does not
emphasize estimates of intertemporal distortions arising from the
differential treatment of consumption in different time periods.
Finally, the approach is amenable to the inclusion of financial
distortions arising from the differential treatment of debt and—2—
equity. The current model necessarily deals with many of these
financing considerations, but it does not encompass endogenous
financial decisionmaking. We therefore compare multiple distor-
tions in the allocation of real capital only.'
We use a cost of capital approach in the tradition of Hall
and Jorgenson (1967) to measure the incentives to invest in each
combination of asset, sector, and industry. These user costs can
be reexpressed as "marginal effective tax rates," and so the
results of our model can be contrasted with those of previous
studies that base incentives on actual taxes paid, or "average
effective tax rates."
Our model incorporates effects of taxes on many different
kinds of investment decisions, so results necessarily depend on
the specification of how these decisions are made. For this
reason, we present considerable sensitivity analysis with respect
to key substitution elasticities. While numerical magnitudes
always depend in part on these parameters, important qualitative
results often do not. A further important result of these
sensitivity studies is that they provide a clear agenda for
future econometric measurement.
Our main finding is that, for a broad range of substitution
elasticities, interasset distortions under current law are larger
than intersectoral or interindustry distortions. Indeed, the
distortion between the corporate sector and the noncorporate
business sector is almost nonexistent. In sum, these multiple
distortions impose an annual welfare cost that is still below one
percent of national output.—3—
The next section provides a context for our results by
reviewing the previous literature. The remaining sections then
proceed to address the simultaneous modeling of interasset,
intersectoral, and interindustry distortions; the efficiency
gains from removing each of these distortions; and the importance
of sensitivity analysis. A brief summary concludes the paper.
I. A Review of Previous Studies
The issue of intersectoral tax distortions has been studied
extensively. Harberger (1962, 1966) used a general equilibrium
model to measure the misallocation of real capital between the
corporate and noncorporate sectors. He found an efficiency cost
from this distortion that was about 0.5 percent of GNP. Today
this percentage would represent a $20 billion annual loss.
Shoven and Whalley (1972) and Shoven (1976) showed how to
incorporate taxes in a computational general equilibrium model
with more consumer groups and production sectors, and this method
is used in the larger, more recent general equilibrium model of
Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (FSW, 1983). This model measures
the misallocation of capital among 18 industries, where tax
differences arise because corporations make up a larger fraction
of firms in some industries, and because corporations use differ-
ent combinations of interest, dividends, and retained earnings.
Tax rates in the FSW model are measured by the total of observed
corporate taxes, property taxes, and personal taxes as a fraction
of capital income in each industry. A simulation that equalized
capital tax rates across industries resulted in a welfare gain
that was 0.6 percent of "expanded national income."2 In general,
the disaggregation of Harberger's two sectors tends to increase—4--
this efficiency measure, because it captures differences among
effective tax rates within each sector.
Both the Harberger and the FSW models use "average" effective
tax rates, measured for existing assets, rather than "marginal"
effective tax rates that would apply to incremental uses of
capital. Marginal effective tax rates cannot capture every rele-
vant detail of the tax code, but the concept of the tax on a new
investment is clearly preferred as a measure of the incentive to
invest. Average rates include elements of lump—sum taxes on
previous investments. In fact, Feldstein, Dicks—Mireaux and
Poterba (1983) found that total taxes paid were 70 percent of
capital income in the corporate sector, prior to the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. This average effective total tax rate
is twice the estimate of the marginal effective total tax rate in
King and Fullerton (1984) or Fullerton and Henderson (1984).
No study has compared distortions among assets, sectors, and
industries. First, any comparison must be based on a methodology
of marginal effective tax rates, since there is no way to observe
average effective tax rates for particular assets. Second,
general equilibrium models that have measured marginal effective
tax rates have examined industries or sectors or assets, but not
all three.3
MisallocationS among assets were measured in papers by
Gravelle (1981) and Auerbach (1983). They calculated the mar-
ginal cost of capital for each of about 30 types of equipment and
structures, and they found welfare costs in the range of 01O to
0.15 percent of GNP. In these papers, the new allocation re-
flects equilibrium in the market for real capital, but it is not—5—-
a general equilibrium. The models apply only to corporate
capital, not total capital. Although each industry uses a
different mix of assets in the Auerbach study, both of these
studies employ Cobb—Douglas demands, and neither captures
misallocations among sectors.
Other papers measure misallocations among assets and sectors,
but not among industries. Hendershott and Ru (1980) examine six
categories of assets in the corporate, noncorporate, and owner—
occupied housing sectors.4 Like Gravelle and Auerbach,
Hendershott and Ru model the capital market, not the overall
economy, and they assume Cobb—Douglas demands for capital. They
find that unequal capital taxation causes an annual output loss
of .57 percent of GNP. About three—fourths of this total is
attributable to the misallocation between owner—occupied housing
and business capital. Less than one—fourth is due to
misallocations between the corporate and noncorporate business
sectors, and only a trivial fraction is due to misallocations
among assets.5
Finally, the model of Jorgenson and Yun (1984) encompasses
intersectoral, interasset, and intertemporal distortions, but it
does not disaggregate by industry. In this econometrically—
estimated general equilibrium model, there are corporate, non—
corporate, and household sectors which each use a short—lived
asset and a long—lived asset. They estimate that the welfare
gains from eliminating iriterasset differences within the cor-
porate and noncorporate business sectors would be 9.7 percent of
the present discounted value of welfare in the baseline, This is—6—
considerably larger than the percentage gain in any of the pre-
vious studies. Quite surprisingly, however, Jorgenson and Yun
find a welfare loss from eliminating tax differences between the
two business sectors.6
The model that we develop in the following section differs
from previous models by including general equilibrium calcula-
tions in combination with disaggregation of assets, sectors, and
industries. Furthermore, the model is not limited to unitary
capital demand elasticities. We are thus able to provide more
sensitivity analysis to explore the robustness of our results.
II. A Generalized Model
Features of our general equilibrium model not related to the
allocation of capital are taken from the Fullerton—Shoven—Whalley
model, as described in Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley
(1985). On the consumption side, each of 12 income—differen-
tiated households has initial endowments of labor and capital
that can be sold for use in production. As indicated in the top
part of Figure 1, these households each maximize a nested utility
function by making an initial allocation of resources between
present consumption and saving. The elasticity of substitution
between present and future consumption is based on an aggregate
estimate of 0.4 for the uncompensated savings elasticity with
respect to the net rate of return. The model is capable of
simulating a sequence of equilibria in which the capital stock
increases as a result of saving. The specification of saving
behavior does not affect the simulations we perform below,
because we do not change the overall incentive to save or invest.—7—
Also, while the economy in this model is open to balanced
international flows of goods and services, it is not open to
international capital flows. We therefore look only at a one—
period equilibrium, with a fixed capital stock.7
With present resources, as indicated in the next level of
Figure 1, a household can choose to buy some of its own labor
endowment for leisure. The elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure is based on an aggregate estimate of 0.15
for the uncompensated labor supply elasticity with respect to the
net—of—tax wage. Present consumption expenditures are then
divided among 15 consumer goods according to a Cobb—Douglas
subutility nest. Each consumer good is a fixed—coefficient
combination of outputs of the 18 industries.8 The model includes
the entire spectrum of Federal, state, and local taxes, typically
modeled as ad valorem tax rates on purchases of appropriate
products or factors.9
The structure of production is displayed in the bottom half
of Figure 1.Each industry determines its use of factors in a
sequence of stages, through a nested constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production function. The first two stages are
identical to the FSW model. First, producers have fixed require-
ments of intermediate inputs and value added per unit of output.
Second, they can substitute between labor and capital in a CES
value added function. The elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital in each industry is chosen from an average of
econometric estimates in the literature. These average elas-
ticity estimates vary from 0.7 to 1.0 across our 18 industries.—8—
We depart from the FSW model by specifying that a marginal
cost of capital formula determines the demand for capital in each
of the 18 industries, and by adding third and fourth stages of
production. These features are more fully described below, but
they can be summarized with reference to Figure 1. In the third
production stage for each industry, separate cost of capital
expressions are used to determine the division between corporate
and noncorporate sectors. In the fourth stage, within each
sector of each industry, individual cost of capital calculations
are used to determine demand for each of 38 different asset types
listed below in Table 1.
The user costs for individual asset types are built up from
information on statutory tax rates, credit rates, tax lifetimes,
and other statutory specifications. These costs also depend
endogenously on the real after—tax rate of return determined in
equilibrium. A composite of those costs applies to each sector
of a given industry, and an additional composite of the corporate
sector and the noncorporate sector applies to the overall cost of
capital for that industry. Each industry has a different mix of
assets in each sector, as well as. a different mix of sectors, all
determined endogenously. When the total use of capital equals
the total available supply, we have equilibrium in the capital
market; when other markets clear as well, we have a general
equilibrium.
Another generalization from previous studies is that we are
not limited to a unitary elasticity of substitution among assets,
as implied by the Cobb—Douglas functional form. Instead, capital
in the corporate sector or in the noncorporate sector of each—9—
industry is a different constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
composite of the 38 assets. The elasticity of substitution among
assets (c) may be specified exogenously. Capital in each indus-
try is another CES function of composite capital stocks from each
sector of that industry. The elasticity of substitution between
corporate and noncorporate capital (a) is also pre—specified.
When these elasticities are set to zero, our model reduces
approximately to the fixed—coefficient model in Fullerton and
Henderson (1985). When they are unity, the model is similar to
those of Gravelle (1981) and Auerbach (1983). This generali-
zation is important because the choices of c and a have much
bearing on the relative size of different distortions and there-
fore on the relative attractiveness of alternative reforms.
The following subsection describes our model of the alloca-
tion of capital across and within industries. We then review in
turn the measurement of user costs, the calculation of tax
revenues, and other features of our general equilibrium model.
A. The Use of Capital Assets
Using a composite cost of capital (), to be discussed
below, firms in industry j minimize capital and labor costs per
unit of value added. First—order conditions provide demand for
labor and capital per unit of value added. In our model, the
demand for capital in industry j is actually a demand for
composite capital R,. In an additional stage, producers use
another CES function to decide how much of this capital should be




To use this expression, we need to pre—specify ,theweighting
parameters for each industry, and ,theelasticity of substitu-
tion between corporate and noncorporate capital.
Using a composite cost of capital in the corporate part of
this industry (pC) and a composite cost of capital in the
noncorporate part of this industry (p'), also discussed below,
firms minimize capital costs (K p + K!C flC) per unit of






(3) K1nc(pr)[e(p)l_a + (1 -61)(p)]
per unit of composite capital. Solving for the Lagrangian
multiplier provides the composite cost of capital:
(4) =[(flC)l+ (1 -)(C)l_]1
Inthe last stage, firms in the corporate sector use another CES
function to allocate their capital among the 38 assets:"— 11—
1 c—i C
(5) K'= 1c—
]L1l 1] 1J J
Here, we must pre—specify the a.parametersand c. We use c as
the elasticity of substitution among assets to distinguish it
from a, the elasticity of substitution betweencorporate and
noncorporate capital. The noncorporate sector allocates its
capital among the same 38 assets using the same c.It has an
expression identical to (5) except that all c superscripts are
replaced by nc superscripts.
Using the individual cost of capital for each of the 38
assets (pC), corporate firms minimize capital costs (E.Kcpc)per
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per unit of corporate composite capital. Solving for the
Lagrangian multiplier from this minimization provides the
composite cost of capital:
1
C 138 cc 1—c iT (7) =u=.() j
A similar minimization provides KnC.and
1] )
For the real estate industry alone, we have an owner—occupied
sector instead of a corporate sector. The ,weightin (1) still
applies to noncorporate (rental) capital with composite price— 12—
flC butthe (l— ) weight applies to owner—occupied housing with
a price The weights in equation (5) are then positive
only for residential structures (i=30) and land (i=38).
Having described the behavior of producers, we turn next to
the steps needed to obtain parameter values for equations
(1)—(7). No study to our knowledge has ever estimated a, the
elasticity of substitution between corporate and noncorporate
sectors, or c, the elasticity of substitution among 38 assets.
Using a CES production function, Sato (1967) found a 1.72 elas-
ticity of substitution between equipment and structures. Using a
translog function, Berndt and Christensen (1973) found Allen
partial elasticities of substitution between equipment and struc-
tures in the range of 4.4 to 8.4 during their sample period
1929—1969. According to Mackie (1985), these elasticities imply
about twice the substitutability of the Cobb—Douglas form.'2
None of these estimates is directly applicable here, however,
because our model requires an elasticity of substitution among
different kinds of equipment and different kinds of structures.
Because estimates of these parameters are not available, we
provide results for alternative specifications. To calibrate the
model, we start with the pre—specified a and c, as well as data
on and K, each sector's observed allocation of capital
among assets in each industry.'3 As specified below, we also
measure the capital costs p, p, and hthatapply to each
asset and sector. We then solve backwards for the that must
have pertained if corporate producers did in fact demand
according to (6), while facing p from the 1984 law. Combination
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and similarly for the noncorporate sector. This done, we can
calculate actual 1984 composite capital Kc and similarly K' from
(5) and composite prices pC and flC from (7). Finally, the same
strategy is applied in finding .asthe weighting parameters
that must have pertained if industries did in fact demand those
composites Kc and KnC via demand equations (2) and (3):
nc nc K. (p.
(9' 0_ :i I
/ Pf KC(PC)+K(P)a
J J J J
for each industry (j=1...18).
At this point, it is useful and convenient to review the
operation of the model. First, before any equilibrium calcula-
tions, we use Kdata for 1984, individual p for 1984, and pre—
specified substitution elasticities to derive .and.values
13 3
from equations (8) and (9). We are then prepared for calculating
an equilibrium under any tax regime. At each iteration in the
search for an equilibrium, we have a new trial value for the real
after—tax rate of return s. This s is used to obtain p and p
for each asset, as described below. These individual prices can
then be used in (7) to obtain pC and similarly and these
composite prices are used in (4) to get the overall composite
price p. for each industry. This overall price of capital is
used to calculate the demand for composite capital (. At this
point, we have enough information to calculate K and KnC from— 14—
(2)and (3). Finally, individual asset demands K. and are
13 1]
obtained from (6). Since each sector has 18 industries and 38
assets, capital can be allocated to any of 2x18x38 locations
(although some of these uses are zero). We add the capital
demanded in all of these 1,368 possible locations and compare the
total demand to the total fixed supply for that period. This
comparison tells the algorithm whether to raise or lower the rate
of return s, or whether in fact an equilibrium has been found.
When we find an equilibrium under 1984 law, the allocation of
capital exactly replicates the observed allocation in the base-
line data set. This result is ensured by our construction of the
,,and,weightingparameters, but it provides a valuable check
on the computational procedures of the model.
B. The Calculation of Marginal Products
The measurement of investment incentives is taken from
Fullerton (1985). That paper derives user costs of capital under
the assumption that the perfectly competitive firm considers a
new investment in a world with no uncertainty, that it has suffi-
cient tax liability to take associated credits and deductions,
and that the firm does not resell the asset. Unlike the measures
of Hendershott and Hu (1980), Gravelle (1981), and Auerbach
(1983), our measures include both personal and corporate taxes.
The costs of capital used by corporations (pC), noncorporate
businesses (p') and owner—occupied housing (p") are:— 15—
rC—it+ 6.








for (i=1...38). The appropriately—superscripted r is the dis-
count rate for each sector, shown below to depend upon personal
taxes. In these formulas, itisthe expected inflation rate
(assumed equal across sectors), u is the statutory corporate
income tax rate, tisthe noncorporate entrepreneur's marginal
tax rate, -rh is the homeowner's personal marginal tax rate, and X
is the fraction of property taxes that are deducted by the home-
owner. For asset—specific parameters, 6, is the economic depre-
ciation rate, k, is the investment tax credit rate, z, is the
1 1
presentvalue of depreciation allowances per dollar of invest-
ment, and w. is the property tax rate. Parameter values are
described in the appendix.
To compute the rate of discount for each sector, we first
assume that individuals hold debt and equity issued by all three
sectors, and that they arbitrage away any differences in net
rates of return. If i is the nominal interest rate and is the
debtholders' personal marginal rate, then the net real return to
holding debt is:— 16—
(13) S = —
Westart with an assumption that s=.04 in the benchmark, and we
calculate i for all sectors from equation (13) as (s+rL)/(l_Td).
The computation of discount rates then involves examining
separately each sector and each source of finance (debt, retained
earnings, and new share issues). We assume that the financing
decision is exogenous, and that debt—equity ratios are the same
for all industries and sectors (see appendix). An investment
financed by debt must earn the net—of—corporate—tax interest
rate: r =i(l—u).For an investment financed by retained earn-
ings, the resulting share appreciation is taxed at the accrued
personal capital gains rate r, and the individual's nominal net
return must match i(lTd) because of the arbitrage assumption.
Thus the nominal net—of—corporate—tax return r must be such that
r(1—-r )=i(1—t ).The requisite discount rate for retained earn—
re d
ingsis thus r = Td)/(l_Tre)•For an investment financed by
new shares, each dollar of after—corporate—tax return could be
distributed as a dollar of dividends that would be taxed at the
personal rate r. Thus new shares must earn an r such that
r(l—-r) =i(l_Td).The corporation's single discount rate is a
weighted average of these three discount rates:
1 1 Ii(l_-rd)1 fi(l_Td)l
(14) rc =cdLi(1_u)j+ creL(lt + cflSL(l)j
where Cd c, and care proportions of investment financed by
debt, retained earnings, and new shares, respectively.— 17—
Inthe noncorporate sector, recall that -rrepresents the
marginal tax rate of entrepreneurs. Then the noncorporate firm's
debt costs i(l_-r), and its equity must earn i(l_Td) after




where ri and n represent the shares financed by debt and equity,
respectively. For homeowners, -rh is the marginal tax rate, and a
similar logic provides the discount rate:
(16) =hd[i(1_-rh)]
+he[i(l_Td)]
The parameters hd and hearethe respective debt and equity
shares. Once s and it are specified, the model calculates i from
(13), the discount rates from (14)—(16), and the pfrom
(1O)—(12). The effective tax rate (t) for any asset is
p—s)/p.14
Afinal modeling issue concerns the calculation of revenues
from capital taxation. The FSW model computes tax revenues in
each industry by adding up the payments of corporate, personal,
and property taxes. These tax payments are divided by income
from capital in that industry to obtain an average tax rate that
is also used to measure capital allocation incentives at the
margin. Our model, by contrast, starts with an explicitly
marginal approach to investment. Since the benchmark is also
assumed to be an equilibrium, we use the cost of capital to
measure tax revenues in each industry (j=l...18):— 18—
(17) T= [(P_s)K + (p—s)K + (h _s)Kh ]
Here,p. ,isthe before—tax rate of return (or user cost) and K,
'3 '3
is the dollar value of the stock of asset i used in industry j.
As before, the superscripts c, nc, and h refer to the corporate,
noncorporate, and owner—occupied housing sectors, respectively.
The parameter s remains the after—tax rate of return, assumed
equal for all uses of capital. The value of T calculated in (17)
is not a more accurate measure of revenues than exists in the
FSW model, but it is consistent with our modeling of marginal
investment incentives with no lump—sum taxes on capital.
III. The Importance of Different Distortions
A. Disparities in the Cost of Capital
Table 1 presents the costs of capital (p) and effective tax
rates (t) under current law for each asset in each sector. A
glance at the column for the corporate sector reveals the nature
of interasset distortions. Effective rates for equipment are
near zero, ranging from —.036 (for office and computing machin-
ery) to +.033 (for railroad equipment). Effective taxation of
structures is much higher, since these do not qualify for the
investment tax credit and since depreciation allowances are less
generous. These rates lie between .316 and .483. Tax rates for
public utility property are generally somewhat lower than those
for other structures, since they do receive an investment tax
credit. Finally, tax rates for inventories and land are above 48
percent. These assets do not receive special tax incentives— 19—
(otherthan the subsidy to corporate debt, which is common to all
assets). The noncorporate business sector exhibits similar
interasset variations.
Intersectoral tax differences may be observed by comparing
entries across any row of Table 1. For each asset, the effective
tax rate (and the user cost) are higher in the corporate sector
than in the noncorporate sector. The tax rate differentials are
between 4 and 52 percentage points.
The intersectora]. and interasset distortions can also be
observed in Table 2, which aggregates and summarizes the data for
the corporate, noncorporate business, and owner—occupied housing
sectors. The overall tax rate in the noncorporate sector, 34.7
percent, is only 2.5 percentage points below that in the cor-
porate sector. This aggregate difference is less than might be
expected from Table 1.The reason for this relatively small
difference is that the noncorporate sector tends to use a higher
proportion of high—taxed assets, such as land.'5 Table 2 does
point to a larger gap, however, between the taxation of business
capital and the taxation of household capital. As a result of
local property taxes, owner—occupied housing is shown to be taxed
at a 23.2 percent rate. However, this is still 11.5 points below
the rate in the noncorporate business sector and 14 points below
the rate in the corporate sector.
Overall, relative to our assumed 4 percent net—of—all—tax
return, the 6 percent economy—wide cost of capital implies a 33.1
percent total effective tax rate. The standard deviation in the
cost of capital is 1.2 points, weighted by the amount of capital
of each type in each sector.— 20—
B.General Equilibrium Analysis of Tax Equalization
Harberger's model had only two sectors, and his noncorporate
sector included owner—occupied housing. Our model does not have
the same aggregation, so we offer several simulations for compar-
ison. We first examine the misallocation of capital between the
corporate and noncorporate business sectors. We then add owner—
occupied housing as a third sector to measure total intersectoral
distortions. Next, we isolate interasset distortions by them-
selves. Each of these simulations partially removes differences
among industries. When we eliminate all intersectoral
differences and interasset differences, the calculations
necessarily also eliminate industry differences, since these were
based totally on different compositions of assets and sectors.
1.Corporate and Noncorporate Business Sectors. When we
remove distortions between the two business sectors, but we
preserve the differences among assets within eachsector.'6
Specifically, for each of the 36 nonresidential assets listed in
Table 1, we equalize the tax treatment across the two sectors by
assigning to that asset the average cost of capital for corporate
and noncorporate uses.
This simulation eliminates intersectoral differences for each
asset, but it does not equalize the two weighted—average user
costs because the two sectors use different mixes of assets. The
first column of Table 2 shows that the costs of capital under
current law are .064 in the corporate sector and .061 in the non—
corporate sector. This simulation is not shown in Table 2 but
the weighted average user costs are .057 for the corporate sector
and .064 for the noncorporate sector.17— 21—
Inorder to concentrate on the allocation of capital across
sectors in our simulations, and to compare our results with the
previous literature, we adopt the common assumption that asset
demands are Cobb—Douglas (c=l).'8 The efficiency gain in this
case should be related to the value of a, which measures the
responsiveness of intersectoral capital allocation to
differentials in user cost. If firms readily change their
corporate status in response to changes in tax differentials,
then a is high and intersectoral distortions may be high. On the
other hand, it may be that the corporate—noncorporate allocation
is influenced heavily by other factors. For example, Ebrill and
Hartman (1983) posit that firms tend to incorporate when they
reach a size that requires them to have access to national
financial markets. If this is the case, then a may be small and
sector tax equalization may result in little welfare gain.
In the case where bothand a are one, removal of this
intersectoral distortion provides a welfare gain that is .007
percent of expanded national income. There is no configuration
of elasticity parameters that can make this welfare effect any-
thing other than tiny in comparison to the .5 percent of national
income found by Harberger. The reason, of course, is that mar-
ginal effective tax rates are very similar in the two sectors,
where Harberger's average effective tax rates differed more
substantially. Two key elements account for the small size of
the surtax in the corporate sector. First, debt—financed cor-
porate investments receive a subsidy from the fact that the tax
rate at which corporations deduct interest payments is substan-
tially above the marginal rate of the average interest recipient.
See appendix parameters and Fullerton (1985). Second, personal— 22—
incometaxes on corporate dividends affect investment only for
the small fraction financed by new shares. This result is con-
sistent with the "new view" of King (1977), Auerbach (1979), and
Bradford (1981). To simulate the "old view" that dividend taxes
are important for investment incentives, we later assume that all
of the equity fraction of new investment must come from new
shares.
2. Business and Housing Sectors. The Harberger analysis can
be extended to distortions between the business sector and the
owner—occupied housing sector. In this model, we can eliminate
all of these intersectoral distortions. As indicated in the
middle two columns of Table 2, we equalize the tax cost of any
given asset wherever it is used. Here, however, we provide more
sensitivity analysis.
Intersectoral distortions are expected to vary with the
sectoral substitution elasticity. Figure 2 shows the welfare
gains from sector tax equalization as a varies from 0.2 to 4.0,
with c held constant at 1. The gains range from $0.8 to $8.4
billion (1984 dollars). As a proportion of expanded national
income,'9 these annual gains are between 0.02 and 0.18 percent.
These welfare gains are still fairly small because they do
not address a major source of the economy—wide disparities in the
taxation of income from capital. As shown in Table 2, equaliza-
tion of sector tax rates would lower the standard deviation of
user costs only from 1.2 percentage points to 1.0 points.
3. Relative Treatment of Assets. To isolate interasset
distortions, we perform an experiment where we preserve sectoral
differences in the cost of capital but equalize the cost of
capital for assets within each sector. Operationally, we first— 23—
assignall assets in the corporate sector a capital cost of .064,
the average for that sector. Then nonresidential assets in the
noncorporate sector are all assigned the cost of capital that
reflects the current weighted average difference between thenon—
corporate and corporate sectors. Residential assets in the
noncorporate sector receive a similar adjustment relative to
owner—occupied housing.2° Finally, the resulting capital costs
are all scaled to reproduce the original 6 percent economy—wide
cost of capital. The last two columns of Table 2 show these
capital costs for the general equilibrium calculations. For
sensitivity analysis in these simulations, we vary c, the asset
substitution parameter, from 0.2 to 4.0 while holdinga, the
sector substitution parameter, at one. As indicated in Figure 3,
the gains range from $0.4 to $28.5 billion (1984 dollars), or
from 0.01 to 0.62 percent of expanded national income.2'
4.Comparisons. Efficiency gains from asset tax equaliza-
tion are generally larger than those from sector tax equalization
in our model. Some intuition for this result is provided in
Table 2, where the weighted standard deviation of capital costs
is 0.7 percent for asset equalization, compared to 1.0 percent
for sector tax equalization. The simulations confirm that for a
wide range of substitution elasticities in our model, unequal
taxation of assets contributes more to tax distortions than does
unequal taxation of sectors.
This finding is reversed only if the elasticity of asset sub-
stitution is very low, or if the elasticity of sector substitu-
tion is very high. When a=1, Figure 3 shows that the elasticity
of asset substitution must be below 0.4 for the gains from— 24—
eliminatingsectoral differences to be higher than the gains from
eliminating asset differences. Yet previously—cited econometric
studies indicate a high elasticity of substitution between equip-
ment and structures.
As shown in Figure 2, where c=1, disparities in asset tax
rates create more distortion in this model than disparities in
sector tax rates unless a is at least 3.0. If c is actually
higher than 1, the threshold value of a would be even greater.
The possibility that capital moves readily across sectors in
response to tax differentials is a matter on which there is
little evidence. The hypothesis of Ebrill and Hartrnan at least
suggests that there may be important factors apart from taxation
that influence this decision.
Figures 2 and 3 also show the efficiency gains from removing
all differentials in tax rates among all uses of capital. In
these simulations, the cost of capital is set to .060 for all
assets and all sectors. It is therefore equal for all industries
as well. Thus the standard deviation of p is zero. The corre-
sponding tax rate is 33.1 percent. Under the cases shown, the
highest potential gain from comprehensive capital tax equaliza-
tion is $34.4 billion, in the simulation where c=4 and u=1. This
is 0.74 percent of expanded national income. Since the welfare
gains from tax equalization vary substantially with assumptions
about elasticities, our results indicate the importance of econo-
metric evidence on a and .Suchevidence, however, is not
likely to reverse our results on the ranking of interasset and
intersectoral distortions.— 25—
Anissue that does affect our results significantly is the
importance of dividend taxes. In the logic of section II.B
above, personal taxes on dividends do not affect the rate of
return to an investment financed by retained earnings, because
they affect equally the later increase in dividends in the
numerator and the currently foregone dividends in the
denominator. Personal taxes on dividends necessarily affect
incentives only for the fraction of corporate investment financed
by new shares. Because new shares are used to finance only 5
percent of investment, however, dividend taxes play a small role
as in the "new view" of King (1977), Auerbach (1979), and
Bradford (1981). Auerbach (1984) found evidence in support of
the "new view," while Poterba and Summers (1983) rejected it.In
our model, the "old view" can be represented by the idea that
marginal finance is different from existing finance. If retained
earnings are exhausted, then the equity portion of marginal cor-
porate investment must (in the extreme) all be financed through
new share issues. The results for capital costs are dramatic.
Under current law, the
becomes .093, about 50
sector. Welfare gains
taxes are two to three
The distortions caused by asset differences account for only
about half the total, even in the strong case where c=4. This
sensitivity of results further emphasizes the importance of
econometric measurement, not just of elasticity parameters, but
of how dividend taxes affect marginal investment.
cost of capital in the corporate sector
percent higher than in the noncorporate
from eliminating all differentials in
times higher than under the "new view."— 26—
C.The Importance of Capital Tax Disparities
One surprising result of these simulations is that equaliza-
tion of capital tax rates does not seem to generate a very large
increase in economic welfare. Harberger's simple two—sector
model considered only a subset of distortions in capital taxa-
tion, and it generated a welfare gain of .5 percent of GNP. Our
study includes more distortions and more capital allocation
decisions, and it indicates that the welfare cost of all capital
misallocations is unlikely to exceed even this low percentage.
The major explanation for this contrast is that the average
effective tax rates used by Harberger varied more between the
sectors than do the marginal effective tax rates used here.
Similarly, the average rates used in the Fullerton—Shoven-.Whalley
model vary more among the 18 industries than do the marginal
rates used here.22 Fullerton (1984) describes many differences
between these two types of measures, noting elements of lump—sum
taxes in the average effective rates that would not affect
incentives at the margin. The Harberger or FSW calculations may
therefore overstate the welfare gain from equalizing rates.
Direct comparison of the different models does not isolate
the effect of using marginal instead of average rates, because
of other differences between the models. We need to compare
marginal and average rates within a single model. We cannot
substitute average effective tax rates into our model, because
rates for the 18 industries are built up from rates by asset and
sector. Instead, we can substitute marginal effective tax rates
from our model into the 18 industry rates of the FSW model. When— 27—
thatmodel starts with marginal effective tax rates for 18 indus-
tries, the welfare gains from equalizing tax rates is only one—
fifth of the gain from equalizing average effective rates.23
This simulation confirms that the potentially larger efficiency
gains from capital tax equalization in our more comprehensive
model do not materialize because of our simultaneous introduction
of marginal tax rate measures.
There are other possible reasons that our welfare effects may
seem small. In particular, we have omitted some distortions in
the taxation of capital. For example, we have omitted intangible
capital such as advertising goodwill and R&D knowledge. Invest-
ments in these assets are expensed, so their inclusion might
create additional differentials in taxation across assets. Also,
the heavier taxation of income from equity—financed capital may
cause firms to use more leverage than is socially desirable. Our
use of fixed debt/equity ratios precludes the measurement of
distortions in financial decisions.
Other considerations, however, might reduce the distortions
contained in our paper. It has been hypothesized, by Bosworth
(1985) for example, that structures and equipment are financed by
different mixes of debt and equity. Because structures are
better collateral for loans, it may be relatively easier to use
debt to finance construction of structures than to finance pur-
chases of equipment. If so, then the effective tax rates for
corporate equipment and structures might be more similar than
they appear in our study.24 Evidence in Auerbach (1985),
however, does not support the hypothesis that corporate firms
with high use of structures tend to be more highly leveraged, all— 28—
elseequal. Furthermore, Gravelle (1985) found that the use of
debt in the rental housing market is similar to what is observed
for corporate capital in general.
IV. Conclusion
The model in this paper builds upon previous ones by further
disaggregation of assets, sectors, and industries, by the use of
marginal effective tax rates, and by the calculation of full
general equilibrium responses to counterfactual simulations. The
model is used here to investigate the importance of tax distor-
tions in the allocation of real capital among assets, sectors,
and industries. We find that distortions between the corporate
sector and the noncorporate sector are much smaller than those in
the average effective tax rate model of Harberger. Distortions
among industries are considerably smaller thanthose in the
average effective tax rate model of Fullerton, Shoven,and
Whalley. In contrast, distortions among assets tend to dominate
these other misallocations. Even in combination, all distortions
in the allocation of real capital generally add to less than one
percent of national income. Finally, sensitivity testsindicate
the importance of further econometric evidence on substitution
elasticities, the effects of dividend taxes on marginal incen-
tives, and the financing of different investments.1. More explicitly, we exclude distortions in financial deci-
sions, saving decisions, the allocation of risk, and the
allocation of housing among consumers. We include distor-
tions in other consumption decisions, labor/leisure choices,
and the allocation of capital among assets, sectors, and
industries.
2.See the one—period model of Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and
Whalley (1985), chapter 8. Expanded national income includes
the value of leisure time, and in the baseline is about 135
percent of national income alone. In a dynamic calculation
with a sequence of equilibria, capital tax equalization
brought a welfare gain equal to 1.1 percent of the present
discounted value of consumption and leisure in the baseline
sequence. While the model we develop is capable of examining
a sequence of equilibria, the results from capital tax equal-
ization are similar in the one—period and the sequenced
models because our simulations do not alter the tradeoff
between present and future consumption.
3. Fullerton and Gordon (1963) amended the FSW model to examine
marginal taxes, but the costs of capital were developed from
industry—based tax parameters rather than asset—based param-
eters. Assets were not identified separately. In another
refinement of the FSW model, Fullerton and Henderson (1985)
measured effective tax rates for different assets. Yet the
model in that paper assumes that each industry uses assets in
fixed proportions. Thus, while it measures intertemporal and
interindustry distortions, it still omits interasset
distortions.
4.This model is updated and expanded in Hendershott (1985).
5.The measured welfare cost of misallocated assets tends to be
smaller when assets are aggregated, as in the Hendershott and
Hu study. Mackie (1985) finds that the welfare cost from
misallocation between aggregated equipment and aggregated
structures is about 40 percent of the welfare cost associated
with 30 disaggregated assets.
6. The reason for this efficiency loss is not explained by the
authors.
7.Capital and labor are assumed to adjust fully within this
single period. There are no lags or other costs of adjust-
ment. Our measures tend for this reason to overstate the
welfare gains from resource reallocation.
8. Components of the 1973 data set from the FSW model are scaled
to 1984 levels for use in our model. The industries include:
agriculture, forestry and fisheries; mining; crude petroleum
and gas; construction; food and tobacco; textiles, apparel
and leather; paper and printing; petroleum refining; chem-
icals and rubber; lumber, furniture, stone, clay and glass;metals and machinery; transportation equipment; motor
vehicles; transportation, communication and utilities; trade;
finance and insurance; real estate; and services.
9. The model also requires that government run a balanced
budget. Therefore, when our simulated leveling of capital
taxes raises national income, we must offset the resulting
revenue gains by cutting some other tax. We do this by
lowering income taxes in a lump—sum manner. Because of the
small amount of revenue involved, however, the particular
method of maintaining equal yield makes little difference.
10. As discussed further below, little is known about the incor-
poration decision of firms. The CES functional form is
intended only as a representation of capital allocation, and
of thepossibility that it is responsive to tax differen-
tials. Furthermore, we treat labor as homogeneous in the
sense that it can be combined either with corporate or non—
corporate capital in each industry. An alternative structure
might combine labor and capital in each sector to make
separate corporate and noncorporate outputs.
11. Actually, this is an allocation over the assets that the firm
uses in the baseline data. Firms cannot substitute into
assets that were not used in the baseline (where initial
Kc=0). Also, land is one of the 38 assets in equation (5).
Ahygivenindustry might use more or less land in a new
equilibrium, even if land were in fixed total supply. More-
over, the total use of land in the three productive sectors
of this model may inärease at the expense of vacant or unused
land. Finally, we include inventories in equation (5),
because some capital must be allocated to stocks of inputs
and/or stocks of output in order to provide the final product
or service.
12. Mackie also updated the Berndt and Christensen data and found
an even higher elasticity. Finally, the Jorgenson—Yun model
includes a translog estimate of this substitution elasticity,
but the value is not reported in their paper.
13. From the July 1985 Survey of Current Business we obtain 1981
data for corporate equipment, corporate structures, non—
corporate equipment, and noncorporate structures, as well as
the total depreciable capital stocks in each of our 18 indus-
tries. For each of these 22 capital stock figures, we
project to 1984 by using an econometric estimate of the
relationship between economic growth and capital formation.
This information is then used to update a 4xl8 matrix of
asset uses by industry, using an RAS procedure on an un-
published 1977 matrix from Dale Jorgenson. Finally, we
obtain the finer capital allocation by using proportions for
all 20 types of equipment and 15 types of structures from the
Jorgenson data. These data also form the basis for our 1984
values of land and inventories in each industry.14. If individuals earn the same rate of return net of all taxes
from debt and equity, then the firm must earn a higher mar-
ginal product on a project financed by equity than on the
same project financed by debt. In a perfect certainty con-
text, this can be justified only if for some reason firms
must use a given mix of finance. Here, we do not model the
role of uncertainty or institutional restrictions that
influence financing choices. We take these choices to be
exogenous. An alternative assumption would be that firms
arbitrage between debt and equity, such that individuals then
earn different after—tax rates of return. Firm arbitrage is
explored in Fullerton and Henderson (1984).
15. At high rates of inflation, Henderson (1985) shows that the
corporate sector rate may actually fall significantly below
the noncorporate sector rate, because the subsidy to cor-
porate debt finance rises with inflation. On the other hand,
if the calculation assumes that firms use the observed FIFO—
LIFO mix, rather than the cost—minimizing mix, then the
corporate rate rises significantly above the noncorporate
rate at high inflation.
16. These adjustments do not correspond to a particular manipu-
lation of statutory tax parameters in equations (1O)—(12).
Instead, we change p directly in a conceptual experiment
similar to Harberger's original removal of the surtax in the
corporate sector.
17. These differences reflect the relatively high use of high—
taxed assets in the noncorporate sector. While our standard
simulations define sectoral differences asset by asset, we
have performed alternative simulations that define sectoral
differences by the weighted average costs of capital in each
sector. For example, the alternative version of this case
would lower all the costs of capital in the corporate sector
and raise all the costs of capital in the noncorporate sector
so that they averaged .0625 in both sectors. However, this
alternative does not necessarily give any one asset the same
user cost in the two sectors. The alternative definition of
sectoral differences yields some differences in the numerical
simulation results, but it does not change our qualitative
findings.
18. Our production functions are defined in terms of net output,
so we use the cost of capital net of depreciation. As a
consequence, these results are not strictly comparable to
those from other models with production of gross output and
capital costs gross of depreciation. For a given pair of
and e, the use of net production implies greater sensitivity
of capital allocation.
19. Expanded national income includes the value of leisure time,
and in the baseline is about 135 percent of national income.20. An alternative concept of asset equalization would assign the
same cost of capital to all assets in the noncorporate
sector. In that case, however, we found that the cost of
noncorporate residential assets would be reduced signifi-
cantly toward the cost of owner—occupied housing, effectively
introducing unintended intersectoral equalization. Because
our reported calculations retain some disparities in the cost
of capital for different assets, the welfare gains from asset
equalization could be biased downward.
21. When e=l, our parameters are similar to those in Gravelle
(1981) and Auerbach (1983). Welfare gains, however, are 0.18
percent of expanded national income, somewhat larger than
those authors found for asset equalization within the cor-
porate sector alone.
22. The industry tax rates in the marginal rate model range from
274 for services to .429 for transportation equipment. In
the average rate model, they range from .315 for petroleum
refining to .776 for food and tobacco, apart from an outlier
rate of .959 for transportation equipment.
23. According to the simulation cited in section I, equalization
of average tax rates in the FSW model results in an annual
welfare gain of $10.9 billion (1973 dollars). We use the FSW
model with its average tax rates as the baseline, and we
simulate the effects of introducing the rates from our mar-
ginal model (scaled up so that their average is equal to that
of the average rates). With this simulation, the efficiency
gain is $8.9 billion (1973 dollars). Thus about four—fifths
of the welfare cost in the FSW model is associated with the
use of average rather than marginal rates.
24. If debt finance reduces the effective tax on structures far
below that on equipment, then interasset distortions may
remain large.APPENDIX: Parameters for Calculation of Capital Costs
As discussed in Fullerton (1985), the parameters are: u=.495
to account for both federal and state corporate taxes; k=.10 for
equipment and public utility property, except k=.06 for auto-
mobiles; t=.300, T =.245, t=.231, t =.292, and X=.7. These h nc d ns
personal rates account for federal and state taxes, and for the
fraction of investment income received through banks, insurance
companies, and tax—exempt institutions. Rates of economic depre-
ciation (8) are from Hulten and Wykoff (1981). To calculate z,
we use the sector's nominal discount rate and the most accel-
erated options available under current law. Tax minimizing
behavior also precludes the use of FIFO inventory accounting.
Rates of property tax (w) range from .00768 for equipment and
inventories to .01837 for residential land and structures. We
derive i=.104, using the above value of and the assumptions
s=.04 and m=.04. For discount rates by sector, we use financing
weights given by: cd=.337, c =.614, and c=.049. These weights
are derived from the debt, retained earnings and new shares that
are used to finance existing investment, and they are assumed to
apply to marginal investment. Also, d337' 11e=663 hd=.337,
and h=.663. The similarity of debt/equity ratios in the three
sectors is explained in Fullerton and Henderson (1984), while no
source provides market value of outstanding debt and equity on
specific assets.Table 1
Cost of Capital (p) and Effective Tax Rate (t)
for Each Asset Under Current Law
Corporate Noncorporate
Asset Sector Sector
p It p t
Equipment
1 Furniture and fixtures .041 .019 .037 -.085
2 Fabricated metal products .041 .025 .038 —.049
3 Engines and turbines .041 .029 .039 —.025
4 Tractors .040 .002 .033 —.205
5 Agricultural machinery .041 .024 .038 —.059
6 Construction machinery .040 -.001 .033 —.228
7 Mining and oil field machinery .040 .001 .033 —.209
8 Metalworking machinery .041 .015 .036 —.111
9 Special industry machinery .041 .022 .037 —.071
10 General industrial equipment .041 .015 .036 -.111
11 Office and computing machinery .039 —.036 .026 —.560
12 Service industry machinery .040 .001 .033 —.209
13 Electrical machinery .041 .017 .036 —.101
14 Trucks, buses, and trailers .039 —.029 .027 —.484
15 Autos .039 —.021 .032 —.267
16 Aircraft .040 —.005 .032 —.257
17 Ships and boats .041 .031 .039 —.018
18 Railroad equipment .041 .033 .040 —.002
19 Instruments .040 .006 .034 —.172
20 Other equipment .040 .006 .034 —.172
Structures
21 Industrial buildings .. .074 .458 .061 .342
22 Commercial buildings .. .069 .423 .059 .325
23 Religious buildings ... .067 .404 .058 .316
24 Educational buildings . .067 .404 .058 .316
25 Hospital buildings .069 .419 .059 .323
26 Other nonfarm buildings .077 .483 .062 .355
27 Farm structures .069 .420 .059 .324
28 Mining, shafts and wells .058 .316 .055 .275
29 Other nonbuilding facilities .071 .437 .060 .332
30 Residential structures —— —— .065 .386
Public Utility Structures
31 Railroads .061 .339 .055 .273
32 Telephone and telegraph .... .064 .370 .055 .273
33 Electric light and power ... .063 .364 .055 .273
34 Gas facilities .057 .297 .053 .243
35 Other public utilities .058 .314 .052 .237
Inventories and Land
36 Inventories .077 .481 .060 .333
37 Nonresidential land .081 .504 .064 .371



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A Diagrammatic Summary of the Model
Xis a Cobb—Douglas comuosite of the 15
consumergoods X
Capital I(j ineachindustryis aCES function1/
ofcorporatecapital4andnoncorporate
capitalK0.
1/ in the housing industry, capital is a CES function of owner— —occupiedhousing and noncorporate rental housing.
CF
Utility U is a CES function of present
consumption H andfutureconsumption C,..
Present consumution H is aCESfunction
leisure 2. and a coraoosite good X.
Consumer
Each consumergood Xn (e.g., appliances) is a
fixedcoefficientmixofthe 19 producer goods
Qj (e.g.,metals,transoortation,andtrade).
Each producergood Qj usesfixedproportions
of valueadded VA1 and intermediateinputs A1.
A147
Intermediateinputs are the 19 producer
goods, in fixed proportions for each industry.
Value added VA1 is a CES function of
laborand capital K. //\
///\\\
Kc (i'..l,38) KC (1.1,38)
ii ij
Use ofcapital in each sector is a CES
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